Fraud Risk Mitigation in Real-Time Payments: A Strategic Agent-Based Analysis

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"A payment in which the transmission of the payment message and the **availability of 'final' funds to the receiver occur in real time** or near-real time on as near to a 24-hour and seven-day (24/7) basis as possible."

-Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, 2016



Motivation

Fraud in Real-Time Payments

- Required speed makes fraud detection more difficult
 - Manual fraud detection review process averages 5 10 minutes per payment
 - May have to rely on quick, but less accurate indicators of fraud

• Allows fraudsters to be more successful



A. Diadiushkin, K. Sandkuhl, and A. Maiaitin. Fraud Detection in Payments Transactions: Overview of Existing Approaches and Usage for Instant Payments. *Complex Systems Informatics and Modeling Quarterly*, pages 72-88, 2019.

J.L. Taylor and T. Galicia. A New Code to Protect Victims in the UK from Authorized Push Payments Fraud. Banking & Finance Law Review, 35:327-332, 2020.

Motivation

We explore the *mitigation of RTP fraud risk* by banks as a *strategic decision*, seeking to understand (i) the strategic choices of banks and fraudsters and (ii) the *impact on the network*.



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Studying Fraud Risk Mitigation

• Introduce an agent-based model of the payments system

- Define an RTP fraud game played within the model
 - Parameterized by different choices for bank fraud liability and customer demand for RTPs

• Employ empirical game-theoretic analysis to

- Identify Nash equilibria of the games
- Assess the benefit of the different mitigation techniques (*strategic feature gains assessment*)

Contributions

Payments Model





Payments Model



Represent deposits in an account as a debt owed by the bank to the customer

Methodology

debt

--- debt credit

Payments Model



Customers have a **willingness to hold additional deposits** in their accounts (e.g., FDIC insurance limits)



--- debt credit

Payments Model





---- debt ---- credit

Payments Model

















 C_1 draws on its deposits to make the payment







The payment is stored in B₁'s payment queue







At a later time step (**clearing period**), bank queues are cleared and payment processing completes

Methodology





 B_1 uses the interbank network to route the payment to B_2

Methodology





C₂ receives the payment in its account

Methodology



Payments Model: Real-Time Payments



For an RTP, all edge updates occur in the initial time step





Payments Model: Fraudster Node



Fraud occurs when a *fraudster* draws on a customer's deposits to make a payment



Payments Model: Fraudster Node



Remaining payment steps are unchanged



• Agents: bank nodes and a fraudster node

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- Strategies:
 - Bank nodes: maximum threshold and investment in fraud detection for RTPs

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• Strategies:

- Bank nodes: maximum threshold and investment in fraud detection for RTPs
- Fraudster node: target for fraud
 - Payment type: RTP-only, Any
 - Bank target rule: highest RTP threshold, historical success

• Game steps:

- Assign customers to banks assuming they prefer a bank that meets their RTP preferences
- Generate random customer and fraudster payments over T time steps

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- Assign customers to banks assuming they prefer a bank that meets their RTP preferences
- Generate random customer and fraudster payments over T time steps
- All payments are sent through fraud detection
 - Modeled as black-boxes defined only by accuracy characteristic

Accuracy = probability payment is correctly labeled relative to true label

• Game steps:

- Assign customers to banks assuming they prefer a bank that meets their RTP preferences
- Generate random customer and fraudster payments over T time steps
- All payments are sent through fraud detection

• Payoffs:

- Bank nodes: initial deposits attracted, liability for fraud, fraud detection costs
- Fraudster node: fraud successfully committed

Key Findings

- Banks tend to invest highly in fraud detection and slightly restrict customer use
 - Threshold setting is an important initial tool



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 Fraudsters commit fraud with both payment types and target banks based on historical success



 α : liability for RTP fraud λ : demand for RTPs

Key Findings

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 - Threshold setting is an important initial tool

 Fraudsters commit fraud with both payment types and target banks based on historical success

• Strategic mitigation measures drastically impact fraudsters with little disruption to customers



Summary

- Study how banks strategically mitigate fraud risk in real-time payments
 - Employ agent-based modeling and empirical game-theoretic analysis

- Find that banks' balance restricting customer access and investing in fraud detection
 - Allows them to limit fraud risk with minimal impact on customers

Thank you

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